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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
All issues presented for appellate review originate from the final Ruling denying
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce issued by the Honorable Paul D.
Lyman of the Sixth District Judicial Court. Accordingly, all issues relating to the trial
court's ruling were preserved for appeal with the Notice of Appeal.
1.

Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set
Aside the Decree of Divorce when the trial court failed to adequately consider
Respondent's arguments that the default Decree of Divorce was obtained without
adequate notice to Respondent and in violation of her due process rights.
Standard of Review: Interpretation of statutes or rules of procedure is a question
of law, and accordingly, the Appellate Court grants no deference to trial court's
decisions, but reviews them for correctness. See Pangea Technologies, Inc. v.
Internet Promotions, Inc., 94 P.3d 257, 259 (Utah 2004); see also Dipoma v.
McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225, 1227 (Utah 2001).
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.)
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2.

Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set
Aside the Decree of Divorce when the trial court failed to make adequate findings
to support its decision.
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination will not be reversed except for
abuse of discretion. See May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984); see
also Pacer Sport and Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975).
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached
hereto as Exhibit"A" to Respondent's Brief.)

3.

Issue No. 3: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set
Aside the Decree of Divorce when Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on her mistake and excusable neglect.
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside
judgment will only be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion. See Fisher v.
Bybee, 104 P.3d 1198, 1200 (Utah 2004); see also Lund, 11 P.3d 277 at 280-281.
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.)

4.

Issue No. 4: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set
Aside the Decree of Divorce when Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on Petitioner's actions of fraud or
misrepresentation regarding his willingness to enter into a divorce stipulation.
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Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside
judgment will only be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion. See
Fisher, 104 P.3d at 1200; see also Lund, 11 P.3d at 279.
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.)
Issue No. 5: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set
Aside the Decree of Divorce when Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on of Petitioner's actions of intentional
fraud or misrepresentation and intentional non-disclosures to the trial court
regarding material facts relevant to the divorce action.
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside
judgment will only be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion. See
Fisher, 104 P.3d at 1200; see also Lund, 11 P.3d 277 at 280-281.
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.)
Issue No. 6: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set
Aside the Decree of Divorce when Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on her prior counsel's ineffective
assistance.
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Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside
judgment will only be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion. See
Fisher, 104 P.3d at 1200; see also Lund, 11 P.3d 277 at 280-281.
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.)
RELEVANT STATUTES/RULES
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the
local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute,
the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time
begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed
shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which
event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed,
without reference to any additional time provided under subsection (e), is less
than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be
excluded in the computation.
Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Notice of a hearing shall be served not later than 5 days before the time
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by
order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte
application.
Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some
proceedings within a prescribed period of after the service of a notice or other
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days
shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under
subjection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in the
computation of any 3-day period under this subsection, except that if the last
day of the 3-day period is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the period
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shall run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal
holiday.
(A copy of Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is attached hereto as Exhibit
"B" to Respondent's Brief.)
Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
If a party... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery... the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure
as are just, and among others the following:...
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
If a party . . . fails . . . (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories
submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to
serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34,
after proper service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on
motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among
others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), (C) of
Subdivision (b)(2) of this r u l e . . . .
(A copy of Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is attached hereto as Exhibit
"C" to Respondent's Brief.)
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment
is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
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or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or
(3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
(A copy of Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is attached hereto as
Exhibit "D" to Respondent's Brief.)
Rule 104 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a hearing
in cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely appearance after
service of process or other appropriate notice, waives notice, stipulates to
the withdrawal of the answer, or stipulates to the entry of the decree or
entry of default. An affidavit in support of the decree shall accompany the
application. The affidavit shall contain evidence sufficient to support
necessary findings of fact and a final judgment.
(A copy of Rule 104 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is attached hereto as
Exhibit "E" to Respondent's Brief.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case.
This divorce action was initiated by Petitioner Van O. Peterson on a Verified

Complaint for Divorce filed against Respondent Korrin Peterson (R. 1-9). The Honorable
Paul D. Lyman granted Petitioner's Motion for Default and Evidentiary Hearing on the
basis that Respondent did not attend the Evidentiary Hearing and did not produce the
requested discovery and a final Decree of Divorce was entered on December 9, 2004 (R.
132-140). Respondent's position is that the trial court erred, on numerous grounds, in not

Page 6 of 50

setting aside the default Decree of Divorce in that it was entered without properly
complying with due process requirements, that the trial court failed to make adequate
findings to support its decision, that Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set aside
the default Decree of Divorce based on Respondent's mistake and excusable neglect, that
she set forth sufficient grounds to set aside the default Decree of Divorce based on
Petitioner's actions of fraud or misrepresentation regarding his willingness to enter into a
divorce stipulation, that Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set aside the default
Decree of Divorce based on Petitioner's actions of intentional fraud or misrepresentation
and intentional non-disclosures to the trial court regarding material facts relevant to the
divorce action, and that she set forth sufficient grounds to set aside the default Decree of
Divorce based on her prior counsel's ineffective assistance (R. 163-172).
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.
Without a hearing on Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, the

Honorable Paul D. Lyman of the Sixth Judicial District Court, issued a Ruling denying
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce on the basis Respondent had
received sufficient notice of the Evidentiary Hearing but simply chose not appear or have
counsel present (R. 247-248, a copy of the Ruling is attached hereto as Exhibit "F" to
Respondent's Brief). Respondent properly and timely filed her Notice of Appeal on May
23, 2005. (R. 249; see also Exhibit "A".)
C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

Respondent Korrin Peterson and Petitioner Van 0. Peterson were married on July
29,1999, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada (R. 153 at |
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1; R. 176 at T| 3). There have been two children born as issue of this marriage, to
wit: Savanna K. Peterson, born October 18, 1999; and Sydney G. Peterson, born
May 22,2002 (R. 153 at 12; R. 176 at If 4).
2.

During the parties' marriage and until approximately October of 2003,
Respondent's role in the marriage was that of a stay-at-home mother (R. 153 at f
3; R. 176 at ^f 6). During that period of time, Respondent was the children's
primary caretaker, in that she provided for their daily physical and emotional wellbeing, comforted them and provided love, encouragement and support when
needed (R. 153 at Tf 3; R. 176 at f 6). Respondent also prepared the children's
meals, and was primarily responsible to care for them when they were ill,
including staying up with them, taking them to the doctor, and giving them
medications as needed (R. 153 at ^ 3; R. 176 at 16). Respondent was, and
continues to be an able, competent and capable care provider for the two minor
children (R. 153 at H 3; R. 176 at T| 6).

3.

On approximately December 6, 2003, Petitioner forced Respondent to leave the
marital home (R. 154 at ]f 5; R. 176 at ^ 7). When Petitioner threw Respondent
out, she was only able to take with her one suitcase full of clothes and her car and
was obligated to live with afriendin Mayfield for a few days before moving to
Pleasant Grove, Utah (R. 154 at 15; R. 176 at f 7).

4.

In addition to throwing Respondent out of the marital home, without Respondent's
knowledge or permission, Petitioner secretly took cash and the credit cards from
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Respondent's wallet, took her house key, and cancelled Respondent's charge
account at the local gas station (R. 154 at ^ 6; R. 176 at 17).
5.

Without Respondent's knowledge or permission, Petitioner secretly and
immediately withdrew almost all of the money from both of the parties' joint
checking and savings accounts (R. 154 at 17; R. 176 at f 8). Petitioner took
approximately $2,500 from the parties' joint savings account at the Gunnison
Valley Bank, and between $7,000 to $9,000 from the parties' joint checking
account at Zion's Bank (R. 154 at 17; R. 176 at ^ 8). Petitioner admits that he
withdrew the funds from the parties' joint checking accounts on the basis that he
did not trust her. (R. 226 at ^ 7.) Prior to this affidavit, Petitioner did not admit to
Respondent or inform the trial court that he had taken the funds. Nowhere does
Petitioner state that he has placed the "disputed funds" in a trust account during the
resolution of this divorce action. (R. 224-229.)

6.

Without Respondent's knowledge or permission, Petitioner secretly and
immediately removed Respondent as a beneficiary on their medical and dental
insurance plan (R. 155 at | 8; R. 177 at ^f 9). Petitioner admits he removed
Respondent from his medical insurance plan. (R. 226 at ^j 8.)

7.

Without Respondent's knowledge or permission, Petitioner secretly removed her
as the beneficiary of the Petitioner's life insurance policy (R. 155 at ^f 9; R. 177 at
110). Petitioner admits that he removed Respondent as the beneficiary of his life
insurance policy. (R. 226 at ^ 8.) At the time of the separation, the policy was
valued at approximately $150,000 to $170,000 (R. 155 at If 9; R. 177 at Tf 10).
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8.

Petitioner literally threw Respondent out of the marital home and wrongfully took
and converted joint property and assets without a right or proper judicial process or
Respondent's permission (R. 155 at 110; R. 177 at f 11).

9.

On or about December 18, 2003 Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce
(R. 1-9).

10.

Respondent retained her first counsel near the end of December 2003. Respondent
timely gave her first counsel all the requested information that was necessary to
file a timely Answer (R. 155 at f 12; R. 177 at 112).

11.

Shortly after being served with Petitioner's Divorce Petition, Respondent was
released from her employment at Wal-Mart because she complained to
management of sexual harassment by a co-worker (R. 155 at 113; R. 177 at f 13).
After her wrongful release from Wal-Mart, she went to live in Pleasant Grove,
Utah with her mother (R. 155 at 113; R. 177 at 113).

12.

On or about January 12, 2004, Respondent commenced a part-time job at Gold's
Gym making $5.50 per hour (R. 155 at f 14; R. 177 at If 14). Respondent
maintained this job until approximately June of 2004. During this time,
Respondent was also searching for better paying employment (R. 155 at 114; R.
177 at 114).

13.

On January 16, 2004, Respondent's prior counsel showed up late to the Order to
Show Cause Hearing, and even though Respondent had given him all the
necessary information, her prior counsel was not adequately prepared to represent
her best interests (R. 155 at f 15; R. 178 at f 15).
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14.

Respondent's counsel convinced Respondent to agree to allow Petitioner
temporary custody of the children during the pendency of the divorce action, even
though Respondent did not think it was the appropriate action or that it was in the
children's best interest (R. 155 at f 16; R. 178 at If 16).

15.

On approximately February 5, 2004, Respondent commenced a new job at Pointe
Break Gas Station making $7.00 per hour (R. 155 at Tf 17; R. 178 at 117). This
was later increased to $7.50 per hour (R. 155 at f 17; R. 178 at f 17). Respondent,
as of the date she filed her Motion to Set Aside, was working at Pointe Break Gas
Station foil time (R. 155 at 117; R. 178 at If 17).

16.

During February of 2004, Respondent would regularly call her prior counsel,
sometimes even calling more than one time in a day, leaving several messages in
an attempt to learn the status and disposition of her case (R. 156 at ^ 18; R. 178 at
118). Respondent's prior counsel would not return any of her phone calls in
February (R. 156 at 118; R. 178 at If 18).

17.

On or about February 23, 2004, Respondent was involved in a roll-over accident
that totally destroyed her Ford Explorer and left Respondent severely injured (R.
156 at Tf 19; R. 178 at ^ 19). Petitioner does not deny that Respondent was
involved in a terrible car accident or that the injuries she sustained were quite
severe. (R. 224-229). The injury was severe enough to require physical therapy,
which had to be postponed to a future time to allow her muscles to strengthen and
because of the high degree of pain and the migraines it caused (R. 156 at % 19; R.
178 at Tf 19). Moreover, because of the injury to her left leg, side, hip and neck,
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Respondent has been required to undergo substantial chiropractic treatment (R.
156 at f 19; R. 178 at If 19). During the first eight weeks, she had treatments
approximately three times a week (R. 156 at ^f 19; R. 178 at ^f 19). During the
next four weeks, she had treatments approximately one to two times a week (R.
156 at f 19; R. 178 at f 19). At the time Respondent filed her Motion to Set Aside,
she was receiving treatment every two weeks (R. 156 at % 19; R. 178 at 119). Her
injury from the roll-over accident was so severe that she is still currently suffering
from frequent headaches as well as debilitating migraines (R. 156 at % 19; R. 178
at f 19). At times the migraines were so severe that she is rendered incapacitated
and unable to function properly for a few days (R. 156 at ^[ 19; R. 178 at ^ 19).
On about March 2,2004, Respondent had reconstructive surgery to repair a hole in
her breast caused by the removal of a large lump in August of 2003 (R. 157 at f
20; R. 179 at^f 20). Because of Respondent's destitute financial circumstances,
she was unable to afford the necessary reconstructive surgery so her mother paid
for the surgery (R. 157 at ^f 20; R. 179 at ^f 20). Respondent repaid this debt from
the proceeds of the check received from the insurance company for the salvage
value of her totaled Ford Explorer (R. 157 at If 20; R. 179 at % 20). Petitioner
acknowledges that Respondent had a lump removed from her breast, but
nevertheless, describes her reason for reconstructive surgery as disingenuous
because he believed the lump to be "small." (R. 227 at ^ 12.)
On or about March 5, 2004, Petitioner purportedly served upon Respondent,
Discovery Requests (R. 34-35).
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20.

Respondent was overwhelmed by Petitioner's Discovery Requests and sought the
assistance of her prior counsel to comply with the Discovery Requests (R. 157 at ^f
21; R. 179 at Tf 21). Respondent called her prior counsel on numerous occasions
with respect to questions concerning Petitioner's Discovery Requests, however,
Respondent's prior counsel generally ignored Respondent's calls (R. 157 at ^f 21;
R. 179atl21).

21.

In March of 2004, Respondent continued to experience considerable pain from her
accident and continued to undergo regular treatment from her chiropractor (R. 157
at!22;R. 178 at If 19).

22.

In April of 2004, Respondent's prior counsel finally returned her numerous phone
calls. During the conversation, Respondent explained to her prior counsel that she
did not understand Petitioner's Discovery Requests and needed assistance to
complete them (R. 157 at f 24; R. 179 at ^ 22). Her prior counsel simply told her
to answer and comply with Petitioner's Discovery Requests and to return them to
his office (R. 157 at 124; R. 179 at Tf 22).

23.

On or about April 20, 2004, without warning or notice and without assisting
Respondent in complying with Petitioner's Discovery Request, Respondent's
counsel unexpectedly withdrew as counsel while Petitioner's Discovery Requests
were still pending and unanswered (R. 40-41).

24.

On or about April 21, 2004, Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel Response to
Discovery and for Sanctions (R. 42-43).

Page 13 of 50

25.

In April of 2004, Respondent continued to experience considerable painfromher
roll-over accident and continued to undergo regular chiropractic therapy (R. 158 at
127; R. 178 at % 19).

26.

On or about May 11, 2004, Respondent called her prior counsel and again asked
him for assistance in complying with Petitioner's Discovery Requests (R. 158 at f
28; R. 180 at Tf 23). At this point her prior counsel told Respondent that he was no
longer her counsel, and that she was on her own (R. 158 at 128; R. 180 at 123).
Prior to this conversation with her prior counsel, Respondent was not aware that he
had even withdrawn as her counsel (R. 158 at | 2 8 ; R. 180 at If 23).

27.

After Respondent's conversation with her prior attorney, Respondent attempted to
obtain other counsel, however, because of herfinanciallydestitute circumstances,
she was unable to afford the cost of retaining another attorney (R. 180 at f 24).

28.

Respondent did not receive a copy of Petitioner's Motion to Compel until after
May 11, 2004 when Respondent's prior counsel finally forwarded her a copy (R.
158 at 1f 30; R. 180 at 125).

29.

In May of 2004 Respondent continued to experience considerable painfromher
roll-over accident and continued to undergo regular chiropractic therapy (R. 158 at
If 31; R. 178 a t ! 19).

30.

On June 4, 2004 Respondent participated, via telephone, in a Scheduling
Conference with Petitioner's Counsel and the trial court (R. 75).

31.

After the June hearing, Petitioner and Respondent agreed to a stipulation to resolve
the divorce proceeding (R. 159 at U 33; R. 180 at Tf 26).
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32.

On July 3, 2004, Respondent received the stipulated agreement purportedly
containing the agreed to terms of the divorce stipulation (R. 159 at f 34; R. 180 at
1fl| 26, 27). Respondent signed and notarized the stipulation (R. 159 at ^ 34; R. 180
atfflf26, 27). Petitioner admits that he sent Respondent several stipulations (R.
227at1fl3). 1

33.

On about July 8, 2004, Respondent had to undergo a second reconstructive surgery
in order to adequately and properly repair the hole in her breast (R. 159 at % 35; R.
180 at f 28).

34.

In early July of 2004, Petitioner told Respondent that the stipulation she had signed
was invalid unless she took the divorce education class (R. 159 at ^f 36; R. 180 at Tf
27). Respondent immediately called and signed up for the divorce education class
at the next available time, which was held approximately August 16, 2004 (R. 159
a t p 6 ; R . 180 at If 27).

35.

After taking the divorce class, Respondent called Petitioner informing him that she
had signed the stipulation and had taken the divorce education class (R. 159 at ^f
37; R. 181 at Tf 29). She then sent the notarized stipulation and divorce education
certificated to Petitioner's counsel (R. 159at^|37;R. 181 at^29).

36.

Shortly thereafter, Respondent called Petitioner's counsel to see if Petitioner had
signed the stipulation, however, she was unable to speak with Petitioner's counsel

1

Petitioner incorrectly recalls the stipulation period, claiming it occurred
from June through December of 2003. (See R. 227 at If 13.) However, since Petitioner
did not even file his Verified Complaint for Divorce until December 18, 2003, the
stipulation period could not have occurred as claimed by Petitioner. (See R. 1-9.)
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and was only able to leave a message for him (R. 159 at % 38; R. 181 at f 30).
Petitioner's counsel never returned Respondent's phone call ®. 181 at <[} 30).
37.

Near the later part of August, Respondent again called Petitioner regarding the
stipulation (R. 159 at 139; R. 181 at ^j 31). Petitioner explained that he was only
waiting to hearfromhis counsel and then he would sign the stipulation (R. 159 at ^f
39; R. 181 at 1| 31).

38.

In early September, Respondent once again called Petitioner regarding the status of
the stipulation (R. 159 at % 40; R. 181 at 132). Again Petitioner told Respondent
that he was only waiting to get the stipulationfromhis counsel (R. 159 at f 40; R.
181 at 132). Petitioner assured Respondent that he would contact his counsel
regarding the stipulation (R. 159 at 140; R. 181 at f 32).

39.

On or about September 7, 2004, Petitioner purportedly filed a Motion for Default
and Evidentiary Hearing (R. 83-86).

40.

Petitioner purportedly both filed with the trial court and sent to Respondent a
Notice to Submit for Decision Petitioner's Motion for Default and Evidentiary
Hearing on September 17, 2004 (R. 87-89; R. 90-91; R. 160 at f 42).

41.

The Notice of Evidentiary Hearing was purportedly sent by the trial court to
Respondent on September 17, 2004, only 7 days prior to the Evidentiary Hearing
(R. 90-91).

42.

Respondent never received a copy of the Motion for Default and Evidentiary
Hearing, the Notice to Submit or Notice of the Evidentiary Hearing (R. 160 at f
44;R. 181 atTf33).
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The Evidentiary Hearing took place on September 24,2004 (R. 92).
At the Evidentiary Hearing, Petitioner's counsel proffered inaccurate evidence,
namely (R. 192-195, a copy of this Transcript is attached hereto as Exhibit UG"):
a.

That since December of 2003, Respondent has had breast augmentation
surgery and received several tattoos, implying that because she had the
ability to pay for these items she must be making a good livingfromher
employment (R. 192; Exhibit "G"). This characterization is inaccurate and
places Respondent in a false, negative light. As stated above, the primary
purpose of the surgery was not augmentation, but reconstruction - which
required two surgeries to complete (R. 161 at Tf 48a; R. 182 at ^f 37).
Moreover, despite the need for the reconstructive surgery, the only reason
she was able to have the surgery is because her mother assisted with the
financing (R. 161 at 148a; R. 182 at f 37). Additionally, the tattoo she
received was done without charge by her brother (R. 161 at f 48a; R. 182 at
137).

b.

Petitioner requested to have Respondent's wage imputed at $9.00 per hour
(R. 192; Exhibit "G"). This is untrue. As stated previously, at the time of
the Evidentiary Hearing, she was only making $7.50 per hour working full
time at Pointe Break Gas Station (R. 161 at f 48b; R. 178 at f 17).

c.

Petitioner claimed that Respondent was working as a bartender (R. 192;
Exhibit "G"). This is untrue. Respondent has never worked as a bartender
(R. 161 at 148c; R. 182 at If 38).
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d.

Petitioner represented that Respondent was fired from Wal-Mart because of
an affair she was having with her boss (R. 192; Exhibit "G"). This is
untrue. Respondent was wrongfully released from Wal-Mart because she
reported sexual harassment by a co-worker to management (R. 161 at U 48d;
R. 177 at f 13).

e.

Petitioner represented that the real property was premarital property (R.
192; Exhibit "G"). This is untrue. Prior to the parties' marriage, Petitioner
secured a mortgage on the marital home in the amount of approximately
$110,000 (R. 161 at 148e). For the 4 Vi years prior to the parties'
separation, Respondent helped contribute to the approximately $800.00 per
month mortgage (R. 161 at ^f 48e; R. 176 at f 3). Respondent has an
interest in the equity she contributed to the marital home during the parties'
marriage (R. 161 at \ 48e). In Petitioner's affidavit, he does not deny that
Respondent has an equitable interest in the martial home and does not try to
explain or reconcile his statement at the Evidentiary Hearing (that the home
was premarital) with the actuality of the parties' situation (that Respondent
has an equitable interest in the home). (R. 224-229.)

On approximately September 26, 2004 Respondent called Petitioner again
regarding the status of the stipulation (R. 160 at If 46; R. 181 at f 34). This time
Petitioner openly mocked and laughed at her telling, her that she was "so f
stupid!" and that "I just got everything." (R. 160 at U 46; R. 181 at U 34.)
Petitioner never denies making these statements to Respondent. (R. 224-229.)
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After this conversation, Respondent realized, for the first time, that Petitioner had
purposefully deceived Iter, liia: iu ^ . no: ;ntenc. :• n^-uy. trie ^tipuiaiion t::a: the
.:- 'i - • f •

. -•-. i •. * -

•, -• v'-I • u :a < •-:' ;! --.far advantage in the

divorce proceeding through deceit and subterfuge (R. 160 at ^ 46; il. i h \ ;i r "-;.
After Respondent's conversation w ith I 'etitioner, she oi ice again be;....'.

».r . >r

an attorney to represent her in the divorce proceeding (R. 181 at ^f 34).
46.

Respondent hired present counsel on or about September 28, 2004 and
Respondent N picseni i UUILSCI faxctl and miailuil HI I ..

.

, " y* . :),i"

met ,

counsel a Notice of Appearance of Counsel on September 28, 20 ; *J (R ^3-94).
"V,

Respondent was completely unaware of the Evidentiary Hearing scheduled on

taken place (R. 162 at 149; R. 182 at If 3 5).
48.

Respondent IMK>; iegaliv trained or well educated. Respondent admitted:) iailed

However, Respondent \\:i> unaware that a failure to respond to his Disco\ ery
Requests could result in a sancti J.« *•; - Default Judgment against her w hen she had
previously filed an Answer to his Divorce Petition (R. 162 at * 50; R. 182 at ^f 36).
49.

On December 7, 2004, a default Decree of Divorce was ordered h\ the trial court
as a sanction tc R espondent's failure to comply \ v ith Petitioner's i )isco\ ei >
Requests (R. 132-140).

50.

On March 4, 2005, Respondent t i m e h iiied a Moii- >n io Set Aside the Decree of
»v<

4

*•'

'

!
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"

**
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- ::-poi t :)f the I Motion tc

Set Aside the Decree of Divorce. Attached to the Memorandum was Respondent's
Affidavit, and several other supporting documents (R. 151-152; R. 153-195).
51.

On April 21, 2005, the Honorable Paul D. Lyman issued a Ruling denying
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce (R. 247-248).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent's appeal is based upon six errors attributed to the trial court's Ruling

denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce (hereinafter Respondent's
"Motion to Set Aside").
First, Respondent argues that the that the trial court erred in denying Respondent's
Motion to Set Aside because it was entered without properly complying with due process
requirements. Pursuant to the Rule 6(d) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Respondent is entitled to five days of effective notice of the Evidentiary Hearing,
exclusive of weekends and holidays. Respondent's due process rights were violated
because she only received two days of effective notice of the Evidentiary Hearing.
Second, Respondent argues that the that the trial court erred in denying
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside because it was entered by the trial court without the
trial court making adequate findings to support its decision. Motions to set aside
judgments are normally reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" standard. However, the
trial court is required to make "adequate" findings of fact and conclusions of law in
making its decision. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion in not making
sufficient findings because it made no findings whatsoever regarding Respondent's
claims of mistake and excusable neglect, fraud and ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Third, Respondent argues that the that the trial court: erred in denying
Respondent's Motion i >.j; -•...• a,- because Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on Respondent's mistake and excusable
neglect. Motions to set aside judgments are normally reviewed under the "abuse of

uncontested, of the surrounding circumstances which adequately support her claims of
mistake and excusable neglect. In denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside under these
ci rcumstances, the trial coi it It abi lsed its disci etion.
Fourth, Respondent argues that the that the trial court erred in denying
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside because Respondent se; \ovu ->u: ndent grounds to set
asi.de the default Decree of Dr 01 ce based 01 1 Petitioner's acti :)iis of fraud :>i
misrepresentation regarding his willingness to enter into a divorce stipulation. Motions to
set aside judgments are normally review JL a;..;.: '.:u ara.^ ,•: discretion" standard
However, Respondent submitted credible evidence, that was largely uncontested, of the
surrounding circumstances which adequately support her claims that Petitioner committed
-K:u
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these circumstances, the trial court abused \t< discretion.
Fifth, Respondent argues that the thai \\K i:iai court erred in denying Respondent's
Motion t :) Sel A< iu h > 1 »e ::ai lse R espondent set forth si iffic ie nt groi iiicis to set aside tl le
default Decree of )>:\ orce based on of Petitioner's actions of intentional fraud or
misrepresentation .a:a i.iicntiona; ....-;. vi: closures to ttie •;1al court regarding material
fact'- •\jle\aiiL ic •'•

:
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reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" standard. However, Respondent submitted
credible evidence, that was largely uncontested, of the surrounding circumstances which
adequately support her claims that Petitioner attempted to perpetrate a fraud upon the trial
court. In denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside under these circumstances, the trial
court abused its discretion.
Finally, Respondent argues that the that the trial court erred in denying
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside because Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on her prior counsel's ineffective assistance.
Motions to set aside judgments are normally reviewed under the "abuse of discretion"
standard. However, Respondent submitted credible evidence, that was largely
uncontested, of the surrounding circumstances which adequately support her claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside under
these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion.
ARGUMENT
At the outset, it should be pointed out that all claims of error in Respondent's
Appellate Brief (hereafter Respondent's "Brief) to the Court of Appeals (hereafter the
"Court") originate from the trial court's Ruling denying Respondent's Motion to Set
Aside. As Respondent's Motion to Set Aside was based upon Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, a brief review, demonstrating that all of the threshold
requirements for each claim in the Rule 60(b) Motion were met, is appropriate.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the granting of relief from
judgments and orders based on reasons other than that of a clerical mistake. The trial
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court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under
Rui. -»:r and i^ reviewer ;::'ici.:'^:. L::-V, ^ .-. a:.,v*: J.:vi:. »::..:.....

.VJL ^/'Y/.

r

\.-..

77i i\2d 11 in. 11 . " , I ;aii Cl. App. 1989); see also Franklin Covey Client Sales v.
Melvin, 2 ?.3d 4'^\. 454 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). Additionally, the scope of the appellate

only the propriety of denial or grant of relief." Franklin Covey Client Sales, 2 P.3d at
456. Rule 60(b) states, in its entirety:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
^urp:~iNe.. ;*• excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
I *»::cnc? could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
ivuie 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment
is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or
(3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
I

la I

'v. v . \ .

i \

•.••••.: ) .

•

2

While Respondent recognizes that Rule 60(b) motions are typically
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, because Respondent presents a legal
question regarding her due process rights, the due process claim is reviewed for
correctness. See e.g., Pangea Technologies, !m . C)4 P.3-,! at 2^{>
Page 23 of 50

There are three additional requirements for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure: "[f]irst that the reason be one other than those listed in
subdivisions (1) through [(5)]; second, that the reason justifies] relief; and third, that the
motion be made within a reasonable time." Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel Ass 'n, 657
P.2d 1304, 1306-1307 (Utah 1982). Additionally, Rule 60(b)(6) is not available to one
who should have filed under Rule 60(b)(1) but did not. See Richins v. Delbert Chipman
& Sons, 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195
(Utah 1984).
In Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside, Respondent raised the following
Rule 60(b) grounds3 to be set aside the Decree of Divorce: subdivision (1), a claim of
mistake or excusable neglect; subdivision (3), two claims of fraud (one committed upon
Respondent and one upon the trial court); and subdivision (6), any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgement- in this case a claim of a violation due process
and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (SeeR. 163-172.)4
Regarding the timeliness of the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside, Respondent's has
satisfied both the three month time limit, for subdivisions (1) and (3), and the reasonable
time limit, for subdivision (6), because her Motion was timely filed before three months

3

All of these grounds were preserved for and raised in this appeal. (See
Respondent's Notice of Appeal at R. 249-251; see also Respondent's Docketing Statement filed
with this Court.)
4

Respondent's final issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in issuing his
Ruling denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Judgment without entered sufficient
findings of facts. This issue was also preserved for and raised in this appeal. See
Respondent's Notice of Appeal at R. 249-251; see also Respondent's Docketing
Statement filed with this Court.
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had elapsed from the trial court's entry of the Decree of Divorce.5 Any specific Rule
60(b) i equii ements i ele v anttc each indi\ idiial claim oi subdiv ision will be set i 01 th i n the
body of that claim's argument.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING
TO GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, ON THE BASIS
THAT RESPONDENT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED
BECAUSE SHE DID NOT RECEIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
At the outset,, it should be noted that Responden; na^ cieark mei UK iiuk *>0(b)
threshold inquin T for bringing her due process claim i mder R i ile 60(b) First,
Respondent's claim of lack of due process is not contemplated under Rule 60(b)(l H:" i.
and has been recognize.: i, ia; . \ , , - m. ^:IJ:K..; provL>;,»:i u: : ,UCV^!:N/O). •»
Matter of Estate ofPeppc:. " i i P.2d 261, 263 (utaii i985:(1 ( Apnelia'v'

• u\e

-•. - .. *?<s

ground of defective notice was analyzed under Rule 60(b)(6)): sec also Bish s Sheet
'.'« .. .

•
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^

'
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.:J-S.' p r . : J C ^ o f

law is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6)). Second, a denial of due process that results
in an issuance of a default divorce would clearly justify relief from such an order.
Finall> , Respondent's I \ lotion to Set Aside w as filed w ithin a i easonable tin le as it v < as
As set forth in the Record on Appeal, the Decree of Divorce was entered on
December 9, 2004 and Respondent's Motion to Set Aside was entered on March 4, 2005.
(See R. 132-140 and R. 151-152.) Thus, it is clear that R espondent's Rule 60(b) Motion
was timely and properly filed.
5

I his case was decided under a prior version of Rule 60(b), where
subdivision (7) provided for relief from judgment for "any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment." In the Matter of Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d at 263,
fii 1. The language of this subdivision is now found under Rule 60(b)(6) of 1 hah Rul-s of
Civil Procedure.
7

1 '1 lis case vv as also decided undei a pi ior version <M : «.<. -< l*\
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filed within three months of the entry of Default Judgment. Thus, all of the requirements
to satisfy a threshold showing for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) were clearly met.
A.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error In Failing to Correctly
Consider Respondent's Lack of Due Process Issue.

In ruling on Respondent's Motion to Set Aside, specifically, with respect to her
claim that her due process rights were violated because she did not receive timely notice
of the Evidentiary Hearing, the trial court made the following statement:
[t]he primary factual dispute in this matter revolves around whether the
Respondent was sent notices regarding the [trial court' s] proceedings after the
[trial court's] June 4, 2004 scheduling conference.. . . She claims that after
that date she received no notices
This claim is not credible
The [trial
court] has reviewed the file and is still of the opinion... that the Respondent
had adequate notice and chose not to appear and not to have counsel present.
(R. 247-248; Exhibit "F".) In reviewing the trial court's Ruling, it is apparent that the
trial court was convinced that Respondent knew about the Evidentiary Hearing and
simply chose to ignore it. {See R. 247-248; Exhibit "F"). However, regardless of the
accuracy or veracity of the trial court's conclusion,8 it is also very apparent and plain that
the trial court's conclusion completely misses the point of Respondent's procedural due
process argument. The thrust of Respondent's argument and her primary point is that her
due process rights were violated because the notice of the hearing was not sent out
properly or pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and not whether she received
notice of or was aware of the hearing.

8

Respondent has submitted a sworn affidavit that she never received a copy
of the Notice of Evidentiary Hearing sent by the trial court. {See R. 159 at \ 33.)
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One of the fundamental features oi auc process is that it "requires mat notice he

259 (quoting Riggins e; a!, v. Dis:. (V;//r; oi Sail Lake County c: JL. 5 ! P.2d 645, 660
u :ai! t v.O' tinier:^, juotes omitted)). 1 'lain 1> , R espondent's argumem uoc: i- innge
on whether she was present at the previous June 4, 2004 hearing (where no Evidentiary
Hearing date was set), whether -.lie later actually received the trial court's notice of the

accompanying memorandum to her Motion to Set Aside, regardless of whether
Respondent actually received the trial court's notice of the hearing, Respondent's
i

1 mo\ v ledge does not affect the du e • ; n < : K "£ >ss ./;///\ ic
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Evidentiary Hearing.
According to the trial court records, Petitioner filed with the trial court and sent

day, the trial court sent, b y mail, a Notice of Evidentiary Hearing to Respondent advising
her of the Evidentiary Hearing scheduled \^\ September _4. JU(-4. (bet i-. '••'•;
6 >f1 he I JtahR i lies* )f Civil Prr **'• -

>.AM- >o
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specifically sets forth the m i n i m u m period oi notice required to effect proper notice:
-Notice vi a iicdiuij; snail be served not uuer man j a ays before ine u.ue
specified fnnh.~ hearing, unless a different perkx3 i< fiv.;V hy t h e s e m \ r < . « !v.

9

Respondent adamantly maintains that she never received either Petitioner's
Notice to Submit or the trial c o n n ' s Notice of Evidentiary Hearing. (See R. 160 at % 44.)
Again, regardless of whether Respondent actually received the Notices, the Notices
violate the fundamental principles of due process because she did not receive adequate
notice pursuant t" *bc i f*nh Rv\r< of OVi] Procedure and established case law.
P . ii r o ' ) 7 , ,f

Z( i

order of the court. Such an order may for cause be made on ex parte
application.
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days
shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under section
(a) [i.e., where the prescribed period of time is less than 11 days, exclusive of
the mailing period, intermediate weekends and legal holidays are excluded
from the computation]....
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(d), (e) (emphasis added). Thus, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
plainly require five days of actual notice of the hearing, exclusive of weekends, holidays
and the three day mailing period.10 In this case, in order for the notice to be procedurally
adequate, the Notice of the Evidentiary Hearing would have had to have been sent by
mail no later than September 14,2004, three days earlier than the September 17, 2004
mailing or the Evidentiary Hearing would have had to have been held no sooner than
September 27,2004.11
Moreover, this minimum five day period of effective notice as required by due
process has also been confirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. In Mickelson v. Shelley, the
Utah Supreme Court held, that despite numerous pretrial reschedulings, that despite
defendant's failure to timely appoint counsel, that despite defendant's failure to appear at
the hearing and that despite notice of the hearing being mailed eight days prior to the

10

For a discussion regarding whether the trial court "fixed" a different notice
period for the Evidentiary Hearing, see infra, Part IB.
11

The Notice of Evidentiary Hearing was purportedly mailed out on
September 17, 2004 (see R. 90-91), September 18th and 19th were weekend days and
excluded from the five-day notice period. Once the three mailing days are also excluded,
it is clear that only two days of effective notice were given to Respondent for the
Evidentiary Hearing.
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hearing, defendant's notice was procedurally deiec:>\ c. and therefore VA\ ;:\ui court erred
in failing to set aside judgment on this groi to :1 "" ' ' '

y

" ' ~ -~ ' "• -.t '<•'"''

Accordingly, the case was remanded for a new hearing. Mickelson, 542 P.2d at 742..
I he Court reasoned a.-loiiows:
Our Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when notice is required and is given
h\ mailing, three extra days must be included in the required time. If we
deduct the three days from the eight actually given, we have only a five-day
notice, and when the time is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays must be excluded. One Saturday and one Sunday
intervened . . . and so effective notice to [the defendant] was on the order of
three days, which seems a bit short in view of the fact that Rule 6(d), U.R.C.P.,
provides for five days' notice of hearing on a written motion. While the notice
of trial was not on a written motion, it is indicative of what reasonable time for
a notice of a trial date might be.
Mickelson, 542 P.2d rt "M2 -emphasis added) '

* v -iuvr " :•- ! "inh Rules ~r' ^ r

Procedure, Rule 6(d) now specifically requiresfive days notice of all hewing, exclusive
i;i.,-additional mailing days, weekends a;K-; i-:;i;.;io, . ..:-.. p:e>en! case. ;: <:;. i;.;*ee
mailing days are deducted from the seven days of notice given, of the four remaining days
of notice, two of the days are weekend days.13 According to the holding in Mickelson and
12

It should be noted that, while the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have been
amended since this case ruling, the five day notice requirement for hearings has not been
removed. Significantly, the current version of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is still in
conformity with Mickelson regarding the computation of the three day mailing period.
Like Mickelson, Rule 6(a) currently calculates weekends and holidays that fall during the
mailing period as part of the three day mailing period. See Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a). The only
exception to this Rule is if the final mailing day (and thus the filing or notice deadline)
falls upon a weekend or holiday, the next work day becomes the filing or notice deadline.
Seel JtahR Civ. P 6(a)
13

The Notice of Evidentiary Hearing was purportedlv mailed out on
September 17, 2004 (sec R. 90-91), September i 8th and I°lh were weekend days and
excluded from the five-day notice period. (-Mice &c three mailing days are also excluded,
it is clear that only two days of effective notice were given to Respondent for the
Evidentiary Hear in J? .
"Dot TO on , vf ^n

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent's effective notice period (regardless of
whether she actually received said notice) is equivalent to only two days, which is
insufficient when procedural due process requires at least a five day period of effective
notice. Because Respondent did not have adequate notice or opportunity to participate in
the Evidentiary Hearing, her due process rights have been violated. In light of such
blatant procedural defects, the trial court's failure to set aside the default Decree of
Divorce clearly constitutes reversible error under the "correctness" standard.14
B.

The Trial Court Did Not "Fix" a Lesser Notice Period for the
September 24, 2004 Evidentiary Hearing.

In Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition (hereafter "Petitioner's Summary
Disposition Memorandum"15), filed with this Court, Petitioner argues that the trial court's
failure to consider her due process arguments does not constitute "manifest error"16 for
two reasons: (1) that the trial court "fixed" a lesser notice period for the hearing; and (2)

14

Respondent recognizes that procedural questions are typically reviewed by
the Court under the non-deferential "correctness" standard, nevertheless, Respondent
maintains that the trial court's error was so blatant and so grievous as to constitute
reversible error under even the more deferential "abuse of discretion" standard the Court
typically utilizes to review a trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside.
15

For the Court's convenience, a copy of Petitioner's Summary Disposition
Memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit "H".
16

"Manifest error" is the standard set forth by Rule 10(a)(2)(B) of the Utah
Rules Appellate Procedure in order to grant a Motion for Summary Disposition. See Utah
R. App. P. 10(a)(2)(B). The Utah Supreme Court has described "manifest error" as error
that is "obvious." See State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah 1992); see also TMD,
Inc. v. Tax Com 'n, 103 P.3d 190, 192 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). In any event, it is
Respondent's contention that the trial court's violation of Respondent's due process rights
constitutes reversible error under either an "manifest error" or "correctness" standard.
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that even if the trial court erred, the error was not manifest error because it was
ha rmless 1? Even with a ci ixsory review of Petitioner's arguments

ih

it is apparei it that

Petitioner's arguments misconceive basic procedural requirements, are unfounded and
without suppon .. .a.. : .. o
Sec Lxhihit "IT". r»i>. !-.7.
'*:.ci gcnciuii/o k^poiiuciit's arguiiiciii as claiming that the in.u
court iaiku ir .\ :. _cr her arguments regarding due process. (See Exhibit "H", p " :
Petitioner's generalization overly-simplifies Respondent's argument. Respondent
concedes that the trial court "considered" her argument (although Respondent openly
questions how much "consideration" Respondent's arguments received, as the trial court
ruled on the Motion to Set Aside without giving Respondent an opportunity of oral
argument and without even addressing several arguments raised by Respondent, such as
excusable neglect, fraud and ineffective assistance of counsel), however, Respondent's
primary dispute regarding her due process claim is, despite case law and procedural law
explicitly requiring five days of effective notice for any hearing, and despite the record
clearly demonstrating that Respondent did not receive the requisite five days of effective
notice, the trial court refused to set aside the judgment, and gave short shrift to her
arguments (and also mis-characterized her arguments by making it a question of'whether
the notice was sent instead of when the notice was sent) by concluding that Respondent
had received adequate notice of the Evidentiary Hearing. (See Respondent*:Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition pp ' 0-1 fr see also R, 247:iS:!:vhibiifc^' i
19

In Petitioner's Summary Disposition Memorandum, he also requests that
the Court strike the transcript (included with Respondent's Motion for Summary
Disposition, Motion to Set Aside and herein as Exhibit "G") on the grounds that it was
not prepared by a licensed transcriber. (See Exhibit UH", p. 3.) With respect to
Petitioner's request to strike the transcript, while Respondent concedes the transcript was
not prepared by a licensed transcriber, Petitioner's request to strike the transcript is not
well founded because Petitioner has not alleged any basis to suggest that the transcript
contains errors or is somehow inaccurate. Moreover, a verbatim copy of the transcript
was included with Respondent's Motion to Set Aside and Petitioner, in his original
response, did not object to the accuracy of the transcript nor did he ask the trial court to
strike the transcript at that time. (See R. 191-195; R. 219-223.) Because Petitioner did
not object to the introduction of the transcript at the trial court level, he is not now
allowed to move to strike the transcript for the first time on appeal. See e.g. D & L
Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (A party's failure to object to the
evidentiary sufficiency of an affidavit results in the party waiving the right to object to the
admitted evidence on appeal). Finally, the admi^ihilib -^the transcript does no* afArt
P-:UTP. 'VI

Petitioner's primary argument regarding Respondent's due process claim is that
because the trial court denied Respondent's Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside, that ipso facto
the trial court "clearly fixed a shorter time for the Hearing." (Petitioner's Summary
Disposition Memorandum, p. 2.) As support of this argument, Petitioner references the
language Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,20 which states, in its entirety,
"[njotice of a hearing shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such
an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(d).
However, Petitioner's argument is completely without merit. Petitioner would
have this Court believe that, somehow, the trial court's denial of Respondent's 60(b)
Motion to Set Aside, which occurred after the Evidentiary Hearing took place, can
resolve any of the prior procedural deficiencies regarding that Evidentiary Hearing,
through the flawed logical conclusion that because the trial court did not correct the error
when given an opportunity to do so, the trial court must not have committed an error.
Indeed, such a flawed conclusion would completely eviscerate the procedural protection
of the notice requirement by allowing any notice problems to be "resolved" by the court
after the hearing.
Moreover, Petitioner's argument is also contrary to established case law.
Petitioner has conveniently failed to consider the Utah Supreme Court ruling in

Respondent's arguments regarding lack of due process.
20

It is assumed that Petitioner meant to reference Rule 6(d), even though his
Memorandum references Rule 69(d). {See Exhibit "H", p. 2.)
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wiurem:_ ; ;_m supreme Court: reversed L tnai e<^r; > reima: u ^.: a^.UL a

judgment because the hearing notice was inadequate.22 542 P.2d at 741-742. Nowher-c T.
the Utah Supreme Court's opin ion does it state, that since the trial court, refused TO set
a side a judgment from a heai i ng sent & ithoutpi opei notice, the trial com t must ha v e
"fixed" a shorter time period. Id. in fact, the opposite is true, while the Court
sympatliized with the trial court's frustration in resolving the action, it held that, despite
numerous pretrial reschedul ings, defendant's faih it e to timebj appoi lit counsel,
defendant's failure to appear at the hearing and notice of the hearing being mailed eight
dayspnoi iu tnc n, .;/*./.\sr, ttiat defendant's notice was procedurally defective, and that
M-—thro *l ;- •-;•'

—* ~- * •: *; '•</*

••

* jtnlfinienl (in lliis ground / "

More telling of the weakness of Petitioner's position is that he has not even
;L^i:ip^\.; ,,> a^;m.:u;-i. \jicKtist)ii iroiv, me present case. The reason io: mis is. m
course, quite obvious: while some of the background circumstances differ betwe -?•
parties, the primary and controlling issue-that of proper procedural notice-is identical.
1 \\wMickelsun. I'ispoiulcnl sunpls JiJ iuil icct'ive piopci )i aJ(,quatc notice oi the
Evidentiary Hearing. As such, the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to set
aside the divorce.
Ihiialh lVli1inni,T\ juTiiiiirnl fails because il does im! HMHIIIonn \»uth (he specific
requirements of Rule 6(d). While the trial court can order a different period than set forth
21

Forth further discussion regcirci;:i'T'\//./(A
case, sec supra. Par: ! \
22

:

•'

a'

...... ease was remanded to the trial court with directions to set aside the
judgment, sei a. r :n da^ for trial and give proper notice of the trial date. Mickchon* 542
P.2dat742.
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in the Rule 6(d), it must actually and officially make such an order prior to the hearing.
Clearly, the trial court cannot order a different notice period ex post facto ,23 However, a
review of a record clearly demonstrates that the trial court made no such order, either
upon motion of Petitioner or sua sponte. It is obvious that the issue was not raised and a
different time period was not ordered by the trial court prior sending out notice of the
Evidentiary Hearing. Because the trial court did not order a different notice period, the
Rule 6(d) notice period of five days (plus three days for mailing) for a hearing needed to
be complied with strictly. Because it was not, Respondent's due process rights were
violated.
C.

The Trial Court Error In Failing to Adequately Consider Respondent
Due Process Argument Was Not Harmless.

Petitioner then argues, that even if the trial court erred in failing to adequately
consider Respondent's due process argument, the error was harmless because the
Respondent was not entitled to a hearing at all. In support of his argument, Petitioner
states that Petitioner was granted a default decree of divorce pursuant to Rule 104 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Rule states:
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a hearing in
cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely appearance after
service of process or other appropriate notice, waives notice, stipulates to the
withdrawal of an answer, or stipulated to the entry of a decree of divorce or
entry of default. An affidavit in support of the decree shall accompany the
application. The affidavit shall contain evidence sufficient to support
necessary findings of fact and a final judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 104. Once again, Petitioner's argument is flawed. A review of the

23

To allow otherwise would render the procedural notice period completely
meaningless, as the trial court could simply resolve any notice issues after the fact.
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pleadings in this case conclusively demonstrates that none of the above-listed bases were
present because: (1) Respondent appeared and filed an answer before the Petitioner filed
for a default decreed of divorce;24 (2) Respondent has never waived notice; and (3)
Respondent never stipulated to the withdrawal of her answer or to an entry of a decree of
divorce or entry of default. Accordingly, Rule 104 is completely inapplicable to the
present case.
Moreover, Petitioner has somehow forgotten (even though he filed the pleading),
that the default decree of divorce in this case was granted, at Petitioner's request, as a
sanction for Respondent's failure to timely respond to Petitioner's discovery requests, and
not pursuant to Rule 104 or for her failure to make an initial appearance. In fact,
Petitioner filed the Motion for Default on the same pleading as his request for an
Evidentiary Hearing. Petitioner was not granted his default decree of divorce until the
Evidentiary Hearing was held. Therefore, because the default decree of divorce was
granted on Petitioner's motion as a court-ordered sanction, a hearing, once scheduled by
the trial court, was required to be noticed properly. As such, the trial court's failure to
provide adequate notice was not harmless error, but instead constitutes reversible error.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS
TO SUPPORT ITS DECISION
In addition to ignoring Respondent's procedural due process claim, the trial court

abused its discretion and committed reversible error in ruling on Respondent's Motion to

24

While the trial court did grant a default judgement as a court-ordered
discovery sanction, the trial court never ordered that Respondent's Answer be stricken in
this matter. (See R. 82; R. 132-140.)
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Set Aside, without making adequate finding of fact to support its Ruling. Generally, a
trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside judgment will only be reversed if
the trial court abused its discretion. See Fisher, 104 P.3d at 1200. However, in making
its determination, a trial court's discretionary ruling must be "'based on adequate findings
of fact' and 'on the law.'" Lund, 11 P.3d at 279 (quoting May, 677 P.2d at 1110). The
trial court's failure to base its determination on adequate findings of fact or on the law
constitutes a reversible abuse of its discretion. See May, 667 P.2d at 1110.
While the trial court is not obligated to set forth overly-detailed findings of fact hi
its Ruling (see May, 667 P.2d at 1110), in this case, the trial court has provided virtually
no findings of fact to support its determination. The trial court's sparse findings of facts
consists of only two brief paragraphs and are set out herein, in their entirety:
The primary factual dispute in this matter revolves around whether the
Respondent was sent notices regarding the [trial] [c]ourt's proceedings after
the [trial] [c]ourt's June 4, 2004 scheduling conference. There is no dispute
that the Respondent appeared by telephone at that hearing and that she had no
counsel. She claims that after that date she received no notices, even though
they were all addressed as they were prior to the scheduling conference. This
claim is not credible. She also claims that the parties settled the case after the
scheduling conference. If the case were really settled, why didn't she simply
appear at the evidentiary hearing with the signed stipulation?
The [trial] [c]ourt has reviewed the file and is still of the opinion, as originally
expressed in its December 7, 2004 Ruling on Respondent's Objection to
Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusion of Law and Decree of
Divorce, that the Respondent had adequate notice and chose not to appear and
not to have counsel present.
(R. 247-248; Exhibit "F".) Thus, the trial court's Ruling provides only some very limited
findings of fact related to Respondent's notice of the proceedings, her claim relating to
the parties' settlement and her opportunity to appear or have counsel present at the
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Evidentiary Hearing.25 (See R. 247-248; see also Exhibit "F".) However, none of these
findings adequately (or even remotely) address the issues raised by Respondent relating to
her claims of mistake or excusable neglect, Petitioner's fraud against Respondent,
Petitioner's fraud upon the trial court or her prior counsel's ineffective assistance. See
e.g., Lund, 11 P.3d at 279; May, 677 P.2d at 1110; {see also R. 166-172.) Instead, the
trial court is disturbingly silent regarding these issues raised by Respondent. (See R. 247248; see also Exhibit "F".)
The trial court's sparse findings of fact in its Ruling leaves this Court (and
Respondent) without an adequate basis to determine the adequacy and propriety of its
Ruling in light of all the grounds that Respondent raised to set aside the default Decree of
Divorce. This Court cannot adequately determine if the trial court's findings support its
denial of all grounds raised by Respondent when absolutely no findings are made with
respect to those grounds. Accordingly, because the trial court failed to make adequate
findings of fact to support its Ruling, it has committed an abuse of discretion.26
25

For a discussion regarding Respondent's procedural due process claim and
the trial court's inadequate consideration of said claim, see supra, Part IA-IC.
26

Respondent recognizes that, because of the lack of findings in the trial
court's Ruling, one option the Court has is to simply remand this case for further findings
on the issues raised by Respondent in her Motion to Set Aside. However, Respondent
believes that such a step is unnecessary because issuing further findings will not resolve
the procedural due process violations asserted by Respondent. As such, Respondent
believes that the most appropriate and efficient action is to reverse the trial court's ruling
denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside and order a new hearing on Respondent's
Motion, or in the alternative, because the due process issue asserted in Respondent's
Motion to Set Aside has no disputed facts and is a legal issue (see infra, Part I), the Court
could simply vacate the trial court's Ruling and grant Respondent's Motion to Set Aside.
See e.g., Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Bldg & Loan Assn., 94 Ut 97, 124, 75 P.2d
669 (1938) (Where the questions presented were purely legal and no fact questions
remained in issues, there was no purpose in remanding the case for retrial).
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF
DIVORCE BASED ON RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT OF MISTAKE AND
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
At the outset, it should be noted that for Respondent to be relieved from a

judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) she must "demonstrate not only that the judgment resulted
from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, but also that the motion to set
aside was timely, and that there exist issues worthy of adjudication." Richins, 817 P.2d at
386 (Cf. State By & Through Utah State Dep 't of Social Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d
1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. Parker 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).27 As stated above, Respondent's Motion was timely filed and there exist "issues
worthy of adjudication."28 Accordingly, the threshold showing for relief under Rule 60(b)
was met with respect to her claim of mistake and excusable neglect.
27

The requirement of "issues worthy of adjudication" seems also to be
described at times as a demonstration of a "meritorious defense." See e.g. Lund, 11 P.3d
at 283. In order to meet this standard, Respondent need not actually prove her defense,
instead, because the policy is to prevent the "necessity of treating defenses that are
frivolous their face," Respondent is only required to demonstrate through the evidence,
that if her defense were proven, it "would preclude total or partial recovery by
[Petitioner]...." Id. In this case, as the default entry was a result of sanction for failure
to produce discovery requests, Respondent has already answered Petitioner's Divorce
Complaint, and if the defenses asserted in her Answer were proven, it would deny
Petitioner much of the relief he requested (and was later granted by the discovery
sanction) in his Divorce Complaint. {See R. 36-39.) As such, if necessary, Respondent
has also demonstrated that she has a "meritorious defense" to the Divorce Complaint.
28

Although a default judgment was entered in this matter, this divorce action
was a contested proceeding. Respondent filed an answer contesting and denying many of
the allegations set forth in Petitioner's Divorce Petition. Respondent contested
Petitioner's position on many key issues with regard to the resolution of the parties'
divorce action. Some of these vital and contested issues include: custody and childrelated issues, alimony, division of the parties' personal and marital assets and division of
real property. These issues are almost uniformly addressed in normal divorce
proceedings and qualify as "issues worthy of adjudication."
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When all of the background information and circumstances, that were provided in
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside29 are reviewed, the trial court abused its discretion and
committed reversible error in failing to grant her Motion based on her argument of
mistake and excusable neglect.30 In Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of his Motion
to Compel, Petitioner correctly states that Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
allows the trial court to administer sanctions, including a default judgment, against the
party who fails to comply with Discovery Requests. (See R. 45-47; Utah R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(C), (d).)31 However, what Petitioner fails to point out is that, although rendering
a default judgment is an option within the sound discretion of the trial court, nevertheless,
ordering a "default judgment is an unusually harsh sanction and should be meted out with
caution." Darrington v. Wade 812 P.2d 452, (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added).
The trial court's discretion should be "exercised in furtherance of justice and should
incline towards granting relief m a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a
hearing." Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981) (citing Warren v.
Dixon Ranch Co. et al, 123 Utah 416, 418, 260 P.2d 741 (1953) (emphasis added)).

29

See R. 153-162; see also Statement of Facts to Respondent's Brief.

30

It should be noted that the trial court made no findings whatsoever
regarding Respondent's argument that the Decree of Divorce should be Set Aside on the
grounds of mistake or excusable neglect. See R. 247-248; see also Exhibit "F". For
further discussion regarding the trial court's failure to make adequate findings of fact, see
supra, Part II.
31

While Respondent concedes that a default judgment was entered pursuant to
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a sanction for her failure to respond to
Petitioner's discovery requests, Respondent maintains that his type of entry of default is
not pursuant to Rule 104 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and cannot be entered
without a hearing. For further discussion see supra, Part IC.
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Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated its position with respect to
the propriety of setting aside a default judgment on the grounds of a reasonable
justification or excuse, stating, "it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to
refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for
the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside."
Helgesen, 636 P.2d at 1081 (quoting Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52,
54, 376 P.2d 951 (1962)); see also Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1977).
In this case, Respondent's mistake and neglect are excusable and reasonably
justifiable when the surrounding circumstances prior to and leading up to the default
judgment are fully disclosed32 and the trial court abused its discretion in not setting aside
the Decree of Divorce upon Respondent's Motion.33
In support of her Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce on the grounds of
mistake or excusable neglect, the Respondent set forth several viable grounds (all of
32

See supra pp. 7-20; see also, R. 175-183.

33

Interestingly, Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent
Motion to Set Aside (Petitioner's "Memorandum in Opposition") does not even address
the majority of the issues raised or arguments presented by Respondent. {See R. 219223.) Instead, Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition focuses solely on Petitioner's
argument that Respondent could not bring a motion to set aside because it is barred by the
doctrine of the "law of the case." {SeeR. 219-223.) As throughly explained in
Respondent's Reply Memorandum, the doctrine of the "law of the case" is inapplicable in
this case and Respondent was fully authorized, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, in filing her Motion to Set Aside. {See R. 236-243.) Why the trial court did
not grant Respondent's largely unopposed Motion to Set Aside (or even allow a hearing
on the matter), especially when Respondent's argument of a procedural due process
violation was completely uncontested and unopposed, is a complete mystery to
Respondent (the opposition to Respondent's Motion was limited to Petitioner's argument
of the doctrine of the "law of the case" and two affidavits that did not even address all the
issues raised or arguments set forth by Respondent {see R. 219-223; R. 224-230; R. 231233).
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which were either ignored or simply unaddressed by the trial court in its Ruling ). First,
Respondent was experiencing, and continues to experience, difficulties because of her
physical circumstances. Shortly before she was served with the Discovery Requests, she
was involved in a horrible roll-over car crash, causing serious injuries to her left side, hip,
leg and neck. These injuries required her to undergo protracted physical therapy.35 She
was required to undergo extensive chiropractic therapy for several months and is still
being regularly treated by the chiropractor. During this same time period, she also had
two reconstructive surgeries.36 Right after the accident and the first surgery, Petitioner
served Respondent with his Discovery Requests. The timing of the requests was
extremely inopportune, and she was required to deal with the difficulties inherent in
complying with a discovery demand, while simultaneously devoting a considerable
amount of time to her recovery from her accident and surgeries. Moreover, her prior
counsel's refusal to respond to her phone calls or requests for help made an already
difficult and stressful situation for Respondent seemingly insurmountable.37
Second, Respondent has adamantly maintained and has provided a sworn
statement that she was unaware of the Motion for Default Judgment and Evidentiary

34

See Ruling at R. 247-248.

35

Petitioner never disputes or opposes the nature of Respondent's car accident
or the severity of her injuries sustained therein. (See R. 224-229.)
36

Petitioner acknowledges that Respondent was obligated to remove a lump
from her breast, but disagrees that the reconstructive surgery was necessary because he
characterizes the lump as "small." (See R. 227 at ^ 12.)
37

For a discussion as to whether Respondent's prior counsel's actions amount
to inadequate representation, see infra Part V.
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Hearing until her present counsel informed her that the Evidentiary Hearing had already
taken place.38 Respondent had numerous conversations with Petitioner prior to the
hearing and he never once mentioned the upcoming Evidentiary Hearing.39
Third, although Respondent should have obtained another counsel sooner, after her
prior counsel unexpectedly terminated his representation (while a discovery request was
still pending), she could not afford to pay retainer for another attorney at the time.
Moreover, Respondent's financially destitute circumstances were exacerbated by
Petitioner's wrongful seizure of almost all of the parties' assets.40
Finally, the parties had already agreed to the terms of the stipulation and she had
even returned to Petitioner a notarized, signed copy of the stipulation. Respondent made
numerous efforts to contact Petitioner in order to finalize the stipulation. Every time
Respondent contacted Petioner about the status of the stipulation, Petitioner simply told
Respondent he only needed to contact his attorney and sign the stipulation.41 Prior to the
Default and Evidentiary Hearing, Petitioner never informed Respondent that he no longer
intended to abide by the terms of the agreed upon stipulation.42

38

SeeR. 160 at 144; R. 162 at f 49; R. 181 at 133; R. 182 at % 35

39

For a discussion as to whether Petitioner's actions amount to fraud, see
infra Fart TV.
40

Petitioner admits that he took all of the funds from the parties' accounts
after the parties' separation. (See R. 226 at TJ 7.)
41

Despite the trial court's skepticism regarding Respondent's assertion that
the parties' had entered into a stipulation (see R. 247-248), Petitioner admits the parties
had entertained several stipulations in this matter. (See R. 227 at Tf 13.)
42

See R. 181 at f 34.
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In any event, Respondent is not legally trained or well educated and was simply
unaware that a failure to respond to Petitioner's Discovery Requests could or would result
in a sanction of Default Judgment against her.
While it is true that Respondent could have been more diligent during this
proceeding, she was experiencing severe, extenuating circumstances, financial
difficulties, communication and representation problems with prior counsel and a failed
stipulation. These circumstances were largely uncontested by Petitioner and provide a
reasonable justification and excuse for her failure to timely respond to the discovery
demands or to the Default and Evidentiary Hearing. Accordingly, Respondent's Motion
should be granted.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF
DIVORCE BASED ON RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT
PETITIONER COMMITTED FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION
AGAINST HER OR THE COURT
The Utah Supreme Court defined fraud as "a false representation of an existing

material fact, made knowingly or recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon,
upon which plaintiff reasonably relies to his detriment." Rawson v. Conover, 20 P.3d
876, 882 (Utah 2001). Accordingly, in Utah, the elements of fraud are:
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3)
which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b)
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge on which to base
such a representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to
his injury and damage.
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980); see also Maynardv. Wliarton, 912
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P.2d 446, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In the course of obtaining a default Decree of
Divorce against the Respondent, Petitioner appears to have committed fraud, not only
upon Respondent, but also upon the Court at the Evidentiary Hearing.43 Respondent
submitted credible evidence of that Petitioner had committed fraud with her and upon the
trial court.44
A.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion when it Failed to Set Aside the
Decree of Divorce When Respondent Submitted Credible Evidence that
Petitioner Deliberately Made Fraudulent and False Representations to
Respondent Regarding His Willingness to Enter into a Divorce
Stipulation in Order to Obtain a Default Judgment.

As detailed in the Statement of Facts included in Respondent's Memorandum in
Support of her Motion to Set Aside (see R. 7,133 - R. 8,146), 45 shortly after the June

43

It should be noted that the trial court made no findings regarding
Respondent's Argument that the Decree of Divorce should be set aside on the grounds of
fraud or misrepresentation. See R. 247-248; see also Exhibit "F". For further discussion
regarding the trial court's failure to make adequate findings of fact, see supra, Part II.
The trial court's sole finding that might be considered related to her fraud claims is that
the Court found it not credible to believe that Respondent, if she had a valid stipulation,
would not simply attend the Evidentiary Hearing and submit the stipulation at that time.
See R. 247-248.
44

Much of Respondent's claims regarding fraud were not even controverted
by Petitioner in his response to Respondent's Motion to Set Aside. Indeed, Petitioner's
response does not even address these claims (or the facts asserted by Respondent) and
Petitioner's supporting affidavit agreed to some of the allegations, and failed to even deny
several other. See R. 226 atfflf7, 8; R. 227 atffl[12, 13. Significantly, Petitioner's
affidavit does not even deny or attempt to clarify Respondent's assertion that the parties'
home is martial property and that she has an equitable interest in it. See R. 224-229.
Petitioner also does not deny that after the Evidentiary Hearing, he openly mocked and
laughed at Respondent, telling her that she was "so f
ing stupid!" and that he "just
got everything." See R. 224-229.
45

See also Statement of Facts in this Brief.
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2004 hearing, Petitioner and Respondent agreed to amicably settle the divorce issues.
Respondent believed and reasonably relied on Petitioner's representations that he wanted
to enter into a stipulation. Settlement terms were agreed upon and a stipulation was
prepared by Petitioner's attorney who then sent a copy to Respondent to sign. Petitioner
informed Respondent that before the parties could enter into the stipulation, Respondent
was required to attend the Divorce Education Class. After Respondent took the Divorce
Education Class on August 14, 2004, Respondent immediately sent the signed, notarized
copy of the stipulation to Petitioner counsel. Respondent believed that Petitioner would
sign the agreed upon stipulation. Respondent called Petitioner regarding the stipulation
and each time Petitioner assured her that he intended to sign the stipulation upon receipt
from his counsel. Petitioner still had not sent Respondent a signed copy of the stipulation
by September 26, 2004, so Respondent called Petitioner again regarding the status of the
stipulation. This time Petitioner openly mocked and laughed at Respondent, telling her
that she was "so f

ing stupid!" and that he "just got everything."47 After this

conversation, Respondent realized, for the first time, that Petitioner had purposefully
deceived her, that he did not intend to honor the stipulation that the parties had agreed to,
and had obtained an unfair advantage in the divorce proceeding through deceit and
subterfuge. After Respondent's conversation with Petitioner, she immediately obtained
another attorney to represent her.
46

Despite the trial court's incredulity regarding Respondent's assertion that
the parties' had entered into a stipulation (see R. 247-248), Petitioner admits the parties
had entertained several stipulations in this matter. (See R. 227 at If 13.)
47

Petitioner does not deny that this conversation took place or that he made
the above statements to Respondent. (See R. 224-229.)
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In retrospect, it is evident that Petitioner simply engaged in inappropriate stall
tactics and feigned interest in settlement in order to obtain a default judgment against the
Respondent. Obtaining a default judgment against Respondent, while simultaneously
feigning interest in settlement in order to make the Respondent more cooperative and
complacent, surely qualifies as dishonest, fraudulent and improper behavior by Petitioner.
Petitioner, through deceit and subterfuge, misled Respondent with promises to sign
the agreed-upon stipulation until after a default judgment had been entered and an
Evidentiary Hearing held without Respondent's participation. He should not be allowed
to reap the benefit of his intentional, fraudulent and improper acts.
B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion when it Failed to Set Aside the
Decree of Divorce When Respondent Submitted Credible Evidence that
Petitioner Deliberately Made Fraudulent Representations to the Court
Regarding the Marital Home and Failed to Disclose That the Parties
Had Agreed to a Divorce Stipulation.

Respondent discovered, after a review of the Decree of Divorce, the Evidentiary
Hearing and the Evidentiary Hearing transcript,48 that Petitioner intentionally mislead the
the trial court with respect to Respondent's equitable interest in the parties' marital home.
Petitioner informed the trial court that the home was premarital property. In reasonable
reliance on Petitioner's statement, the trial court awarded Petitioner sole ownership of the
marital home. Such a representation is inaccurate and made deliberately with the intent to
mislead the trial court. Petitioner was fully aware at the time he made the statement to the
trial court that it was inaccurate and that a mortgage upon the parties' home in the amount
of approximately $110,000 was secured shortly before the parties were married. As a

48

See R. 192-195; see also Exhibit "G".
Page 46 of 50

stay-at-home mother during the parties' 4 Vi year marriage, Respondent helped contribute
to the approximately $800.00 per month mortgage obligation.49 As such, Respondent has
been harmed in the amount of her equitable interest in the equity of the marital home that
accrued during the parties' marriage.
More insidious and deceitful on the part of Petitioner perhaps, is his complete and
utter failure to discuss with or even mention to the trial court that the parties had reached
a stipulated agreement with respect to the terms of the divorce and the property
distribution. Petitioner had not only verbally agreed to terms of the stipulation, but had
had his attorney draft a stipulation for the parties to sign. Respondent signed this
stipulation in the presence of a notary and returned it to Petitioner's counsel in the good
faith expectation that Petitioner would sign the stipulation and the parties' divorce would
be concluded. For Petitioner to knowingly misinform the trial court regarding the status
of the parties' home and to fail to disclose to the trial court the parties' stipulation, is a
deliberate attempt by Petitioner to perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court. The trial
court's failure to set aside the Decree of Divorce on this ground when raised by the
Respondent (and not controverted by Petitioner50) constitutes an abuse of discretion.

49

Despite his assertions to the trial court at the Evidentiary Hearing that the
home was premarital property, Petitioner does not deny or attempt to explain in his
affidavit why Respondent is incorrect regarding her assertions that the home is marital
property and that she is entitled to an equitable interest in the home. {See R. 224-229.)
50

See R. 224-229.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF
DIVORCE BASED ON RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT OF
RESPONDENT'S PRIOR COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
As stated in previously, there are three requirements to obtaining relief under Rule

60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[fjirst that the reason be one other than
those listed in subdivisions (1) through [(5)]; second, that the reason justifies] relief; and
third, that the motion be made within a reasonable time." Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306-07.
This reason is not one contemplated by Rule 60(b)(l)-(5), and Respondent's Motion to
Set Aside was timely filed. Rule 60(b)(6) is "sufficiently broad" enough to permit a court
to set aside a judgment on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Re Interest of
AG., 27 P.3d 562, 564 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (citing Stewart v. Sullivan, 506 P.2d 74, 76
(Utah 1973)). Ineffective assistance of counsel is established by showing "counsel's
performance was objectively deficient and that counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced the case." Id. at 565 (citing State in Interest ofE.H. v. A.H., 880 P.2d 11,13
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)).51
In this case it seems hardly debatable that Respondent's prior counsel's
performance was objectively deficient and that his performance prejudiced her case.
Respondent's prior counsel's performance was objectively deficient and harmed the
Respondent because he refused to assist Respondent in the timely preparation of her

51

It should be noted that the trial court made no findings whatsoever
regarding Respondent's argument that the Decree of Divorce should be set aside on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. See R. 247-248; see also Exhibit "F". For
farther discussion regarding the trial court's failure to make adequate findings of fact, see
supra, Part II.
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responses to Petitioner's Discovery Requests and the prior counsel's failure to respond to
the discovery request, resulted in a sanction of a default judgment against Respondent.
Even though Respondent expressed confusion with respect to complying with the
discovery requests and even though she attempted to contact him many times, her prior
counsel ignored her reasonable requests for assistance.
Moreover, without any notice to Respondent, prior counsel suddenly and
inexplicably terminated his representation while the discovery requests were still pending.
While Respondent's prior counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal on about April 20, 2004,
and Petitioner filed his Motion to Compel on about April 21, 2004,52 prior counsel did not
tell her of his withdrawal or of the Motion to Compel until she contacted him again on or
about May 11, 2004. Prior counsel's failure to timely respond to Discovery Requests, his
failure to communicate or correspond with Respondent, his withdrawal as counsel while a
discovery request was still pending, and his failure to timely notify Respondent of his
withdrawal, despite his knowledge that a Motion to Compel (which was sent to prior
counsel's office) had been filed, were objectively deficient and seriously prejudiced
Respondent's interests and the outcome of this case.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to adequately
consider Respondent's claim of a due process violation. Additionally, the trial court
abused it discretion, in a number of other way in denying Respondent's Motion to Set

52

Thus Respondent's prior counsel avoided, by one day, the necessity of
seeking Court permission to withdraw as counsel. See Utah R. Civ. P. 74(a) (If a motion
is pending, an attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court.)
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Aside, including (1) by failing to set forth adequate findings of fact to support its Ruling;
(2) by failing to set aside the Decree of Divorce on the basis of Respondent's arguments
of mistake and excusable neglect; (3) by failing to set aside the Decree of Divorce on the
basis of Respondent's arguments of fraud against Respondent and against the trial court;
and (4) by failing to set aside the Decree of Divorce on the basis of Respondent's
arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner's arguments that the trial court either ordered a shorter notice period, or
alternatively, the trial court's error was harmless are both inaccurate and are not
supported by fact and law.
Based on the arguments presented above, the trial court's Ruling denying
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside is ripe for reversal. Accordingly, Respondent's appeal
should be granted and the trial court's Ruling, denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside
the Decree of Divorce, should be reversed.
DATED this ^ ^ a y of October, 2005.
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C.

C.VyQc MORLEY
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed, first class, two true and accurate
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT , this 26th day of October, 2005 to:
DOUGLAS L. NEELEY
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
1st South Main, Suite 205, P.O. Box 7
X . ^
Manti, UT 84642
C^A/t^fih
\\ Secretary
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C. Val Morley, Bar No. 6942
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C.
306 West Main Street
American Fork, Utah 84003
Telephone: (801) 756-7658
Facsimile: (801) 756-7659
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Attorneys Respondent

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VAN O. PETERSON,
NOTICE APPEAL
Petitioner,
Case No. 034600189
Judge PAUL D. LYMAN

vs.
KORRTN PETERSON,
Respondent.

1.

Notice is hereby given that Respondent and Appellant, Korrin Peterson, by and through
her counsel of record, C. Val Morley of Witt Morley & Anderson, P.C, appeals, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h), to the Utah Court of Appeals the final Order and Ruling
issued by the Honorable Paul D. Lyman denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside
Decree of Divorce and entered in this matter on April 21, 2005.

2.

The appeal is taken from the entire Order and Ruling and from the Honorable Paul D.
Lyman's failure to address all grounds set forth by Respondent in support of her Motion
///
///

to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, and from the Honorable Paul D. Lyman's failure to set
aside the default Decree of Divorce entered in this matter.
DATED this t 5 . day of May, 2005.
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C.

C. VAt/MORLEY
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on this *£3 day of May 2005,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
NOTICE TO APPEAL to be mailed via first class to:
Douglas Neeley
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
1st South Main, Suite 205
P.O. Box 7
Manti, UT 84623

—b=c:
LEGAL ASSISTANT
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Rule 6, Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional time provided under
subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent and
under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the
continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or
expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act
or take any proceeding in any civil action that has been pending before it.
(d) Notice of hearings. Notice of a hearing shall be served not later than 5
days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed
by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be
made on ex parte application.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or
is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the end of the prescribed
period as calculated under subsection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays shall be included in the computation of any 3-day period under this
subsection, except that if the last day of the 3-day period is a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday, the period shall run until the end of the next day
that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2000; November
1, 2001; November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004.)
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tions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to
other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(a)(1) Appropriate court An application for an order to a party may be made
to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating to a
deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. An
application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the
court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(a)(2) Motion.
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any
other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The
motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred
or attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an effort to
secure the disclosure without court action.
<a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted
under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or_a party fails to answer an interrogatory
submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection
submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may
move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order
compelling inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must include
a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to
confer with the person or party failing to make the discovery in an effort to
secure the information or material without court action. When taking a
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question may complete or
adjourn the examination before applying for an order.
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of
this subdivision an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to
be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions.
(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery
is provided after the motion was filed, the court shall, after opportunity for
hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion
or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the motion was filed without the
movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery
without court action, or t h a t the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or
objection was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order
authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after opportunity for hearing, require
the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to
the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses
incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds
that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after
opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(b)(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent
fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do so by the
court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be
considered a contempt of that court.
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide
or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule
or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b), the
court in which the action is pending may make such orders hi regard to the
failure as are just, and among others the following:

(b)(2)(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
(b)(2)(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party;
(b)(2)(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order
to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(b)(2)(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a),
such orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision,
unless the party failing to comply is unable to produce such person for
examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney or both of them to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless
the court finds t h a t the failure was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of
any document or the t r u t h of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the
party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the t r u t h of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may
apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable
expenses incurred in making t h a t proof, including reasonable attorney fees.
The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held
objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no
substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground
to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good
reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or se?~ve answers to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)
to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take
t h e deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers
or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service
of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for
inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the
court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard
to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized
under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of
any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act
or the party's attorney or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was
substantially justified or t h a t other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act
has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or
attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan by
agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court m a y after opportunity for
hearing, require such party or attorney to pay to any other party the
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure.
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other
material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rules 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior
response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), t h a t party shall not be
permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing
unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the
failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may order
any other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees,
any order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury
of the failure to disclose.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987; November 1, 1999; November 1, 2000; April 1,
2002.)

TabD

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
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Rule 104. Divorce decree upon affidavit.
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a hearing
in cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely appearance after
service of process or other appropriate notice, waives notice, stipulates to the
withdrawal of the answer, or stipulates to the entry of the decree or entry of
default. An affidavit in support of the decree shall accompany the application.
The affidavit shall contain evidence sufficient to support necessary findings of
fact and a final judgment.
(Added effective November 1, 2003.)
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DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH '
160 North Main Street, Room 202
P O Box 100
Manti, UT 84642

•• CA::i
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Telephone: 435-835-2121 Fax: 435-835-2135
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Van 0. Peterson,

Ruling
Petitioner,

Case No. 034600189

vs.
Assigned Judge: Paul D. Lyman
Korrin Peterson,
Respondent.

The Court has reviewed the Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, the
Supporting Memorandum; the Memorandum in Opposition, its supporting affidavits; and the
Respondent's Reply. The Court has also reviewed the file including the mailing addresses on the
relevant documents, along with the Court's Ruling on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact &
Conclusion of Law and Decree of Divorce.
The primary factual dispute in this matter revolves around whether the Respondent was
sent notices regarding the Court's proceedings after the Court's June 4, 2004 scheduling
conference. There is no dispute that the Respondent appeared by telephone at that hearing and
that she had no counsel. She claims that after that date she received no notices, even though they
were all addressed as they were prior to the scheduling conference. This claim is not credible.
She also claims that the parties settled the case after the scheduling conference. If the case were
really settled, why didn't she simply appear at the evidentiary hearing with the signed

Ruling, Case number 034600189, Page -2stipulation?
The Court has reviewed the file and is still of the opinion, as originally expressed in its
December 7, 2004 Ruling on Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact
& Conclusion of Law and Decree of Divorce, that the Respondent had adequate notice and chose
not to appear and not to have counsel present.
The Court consequently, denies the Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce.

of April, 2005.

<&V\svL

Paul D. Lyman
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On April p j ^ , 2005 a copy of the above Ruling was sent to each of the following by the
method indicated:
Addressee

Method

(M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax)

C.ValMorley
Witt Morley & Anderson PC
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062

[M ]

Addressee

Method

(M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax)

Douglas L Neeley
Attorney for Petitioner
1st South Main, Suite 205
P.O. Box 7
Manti, Utah 84642

'X^m.YuMov^

[P ]
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TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING
September 24, 2004
PRESENT:

Judge Lyman, Van Peterson and his attorney, Douglas Neele}7

JUDGE LYMAN:

Okay. The next case is Van Peterson and Korrin Peterson. This is a
similar case to what we just did. Is Korrin Peterson here? Near as I can
tell, Mr. Moody, she's never filed any response to anything that you've
done on this, uh, recent stuff here and a default was entered against her on
September 8th. You've asked for a chance to do an evidentiary hearing, do
you intend on, do you intend on doing just a proffer, or ...?

MR. NEELEY:

Yes, your Honor, the Court — the problem we had was, when we came to
the Order to Show Cause, she had recently lost her employment because of
the affair she was having with, uh her boss there at Wal-mart and she had
moved out of the area, so we didn't, uh, impute income to her at that time
until she got a full-time job.

JUDGE LYMAN:

Okay.

MR. NEELEY:

We still don't know that she has a full time job although he would proffer
that he's had numerous conversations with her that, uh, she has bragged to
him that she's making a lot more money than she did before. That she
does work as a bartender and at a convenience store. What else was it?

MR. PETERSON:

And at a daycare

MR. NEELEY:

And at a daycare

JUDGE LYMAN:

But she had nothing . . . to show that...?

MR. NEELEY and MR. PETERSON:

(talking unintelligible)

MR. NEELEY:

She won't - but we asked her to provide all that. So what he would tell
the court is that the last time she was fully employed because she was with
Wal-mart, she was earning $9.00 an hour. Since the time that, uh, we had
the Order to Show Cause, your Honor, Mr. Peterson also testifies that she
has had, uh, breast augmentation, uh, done. She also has several tattoos
that she's displaying,.so she's had the ability to pay for those. Uh . . .

JUDGE LYMAN:

Either that or the boyfriend's paying for them.

MR. NEELEY:

Exactly

JUDGE LYMAN:

We don't know for sure.

1

MR. NEELEY:

She's actually, your Honor (muffled talking-unintelligible) well, there's
been four different guys that have come to his house who have helped
exercise visitation, so.

JUDGE LYMAN:

I'll grant the relief you've requested. There is one problem in this, I don't
have any proof that your client is taking the Divorce Education class.

MR. NEELEY and MR. PETERSON:

(unintelligible talking)

MR. NEELEY:

Can we then, do the income on her at $9.00 an hour, your Honor?

JUDGE LYMAN:

Yes, you can.

MR. NEELEY:

Okay.

JUDGE LYMAN:

But when's he going to take the Divorce Education?

MR. NEELEY:

He'll get that done within the next (muffled client and attorney talking) (2
weeks?)

JUDGE LYMAN:

Okay, uh, alright, in this case then, do you want to present any other
evidence, $9.00 an hour, his income, you've got verification of somewhere
...?

MR. NEELEY:

We do, we do

JUDGE LYMAN:

Uh, and $9.00 an hour is fine, that's, uh,

MR. NEELEY:

We'd also said that the court ought to do, to make an equitable division of
the marital debts. He's taken care of those.

JUDGE LYMAN:

Okay.

MR. NEELEY:

Debts — We also ask the court to award the personal property as it has
already been divided.

JUDGE LYMAN:

As it stands. Is there any real property?

MR. NEELEY:

There is real property. He had a home prior to the marriage and, uh,

JUDGE LYMAN:

So it's pre-marital property.

MR. NEELEY:

Yes.

JUDGE LYMAN:

So, she's obviously giving up her claim to it by not appearing here. So...?
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MR. NEELEY:

Your honor, there are two income tax returns that, uh, we've tried to get
her to sign also, I mean income tax checks. We've tried to get her to sign
those. She has not, uh, been willing to do that. What do you want to do?

JUDGE LYMAN:

Uh, there's not a lot I can do on it.

MR. NEELEY:

Can we put on the order that she's ordered to sign those?

JUDGE LYMAN:

That's fine, you can do that. How much are they for?

MR. NEELEY:

Uh, the federal is for $ 1,086.00, the state is for $275.00.

JUDGE LYMAN:

Are you intending to split them with her?

MR. PETERSON:

I offered her a third of it, and she wouldn't do it.

MR. NEELEY:

The reason he offered her that, your Honor is because she hasn't - the
parties have been separated now for many months. She's not paid any, uh

MR. PETERSON:

Ten months.

MR. NEELEY:

Ten months.

JUDGE LYMAN:

Was she part of though, the information that was submitted on these
things? Did you use her income information and his income?

MR. NEELEY:

It was a joint tax return.

JUDGE LYMAN:

Okay, then I think it-- they just need to be split 50-50.

MR. NEELEY:

Okay.

JUDGE LYMAN:

And so, split 50-50 and she's ordered to sign them, and he's ordered to
give her half the money from them.

MR. PETERSON:

What beginning dates should I use for the child support?

JUDGE LYMAN:

Uh, when did you file this?

MR. PETERSON:

Ten months ago.

JUDGE LYMAN:

And you believe she's been employed throughout that time period?

MR. PETERSON:

She has.
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JUDGE LYMAN:

Okay,

MR. PETERSON and MR. NEELEY:

(Unintelligible)

JUDGE LYMAN:

And you filed this in December? Use that date, December 18th.

MR. PETERSON:

For the child support?

JUDGE LYMAN:

Yes, sir.

MR. PETERSON.

Okay, thank you.

MR. NEELEY:

Can we apply....can he have a judgement for what has not been paid since
that time? In the Decree?

JUDGE LYMAN:

That's - that's fine. Are you going to have ORS collecting this?

MR. NEELEY:

Yes.

JUDGE LYMAN:

Okay, that should be in there, too.

MR. NEELEY:

Alright

JUDGE LYMAN:

Alright

MR. NEELEY:

Thank you.

JUDGE LYMAN:

Thank you.

4
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Douglas L. Neeley (Bar # 6290)
1st South Main, Suite 205
P.O. Box 7
Manti, UT 84642
Telephone: (435) 835-5055
Facsimile: (435) 835-5057
Attorney For Plaintiffs

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
VAN O. PETERSON,
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

KORRIN PETERSON,
Respondent/ Appellant

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
Trial Court No. 034600189
Appellate Court No. 20050472

COMES NOW the Petitioner/Appellee, Van O. Peterson, by and through
his attorney Douglas L. Neeley and hereby submits this Memorandum Of Points
And Authorities In Opposition To Motion For Summary Disposition. Based on
the facts of this case, Appellant Korrin Peterson's Motion for Summary
Disposition should be denied.
Argument
Appellant Korrin Peterson argues that the Honorable Trial Judge committed
manifest error by denying Appellant's motion for relief under Utah R. Civ. Pro.
60. This is a high burden to meet. Appellant has failed to demonstrate the
manifest error required by Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Manifest error is error that is obvious. State v. Menzies. 845 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah
1992); TDM. Inc. v. Tax Comm'n. 2004 UT App 433. This Court also can defer
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ruling on a Motion for Summary Disposition until plenary presentation and
consideration of the case, Utah R. App. Pro. 10(f).
Appellant Korrin Peterson's basic argument is that the trial court failed to
consider her arguments regarding due process. This is incorrect In fact on this
issue her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Disposition is
practically a duplicate of her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Relief
under Rule 60 she submitted to the trial court.
Her argument is basically a question of timing—whether the trial court
granted her sufficient notice of the Evidentiary Hearing. Rule 69(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure govern notices for hearings. Five days notice is required,
"unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court."
In this case, the trial court, by denying the Appellant's Rule 60 Motion,
which contained the exact same argument, clearlyfixeda shorter time for the
Hearing. Thus, the rules were followed.
Additionally, even if the trial court committed an error, this error was
harmless. Rule 104 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Rule 104. Divorce decree upon affidavit
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a
hearing in cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely
appearance after service of process or other appropriate notice, waives
notice, stipulates to the withdrawal of the answer, or stipulates to the
entry of the decree or entry of default. An affidavit in support of the
decree shall accompany the application. The affidavit shall contain
evidence sufficient to support necessaryfindingsof fact and a final
judgment
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In this case, the facts are clear—a default certificate had been issued. Thus,
there was no need for the hearing at all. In fact, the divorce decree had been
issued, based almost exclusively on the Petitioner/Appellee Van Peterson's
verified complaint, as this Court can see once the record is assembled.
Since the hearing was not necessary for the divorce decree to be entered,
the failure, if any, of the trial court in terms of notice is not fatal. The trial court
did not commit manifest error, nor violate any due process rights of the Appellant,
Korrin Peterson. She had no right to the hearing at all, and thus notice was not
important.
Appellant raises the question of whether the Trial Court made sufficient
findings of fact to support its ruling, and suggests that the Trial court did not, and
that this is a manifest error. Appellee Van Peterson notes that this question may
depend on the record being assembled—especially since trial court's ruling on the
Rule 60 Motion in question refers to other findings on this subject. Therefore, the
Appellee respectfully urges this Court to defer ruling on this issue until the record
is complete and assembled.
Furthermore, the Appellee Van Peterson asks this Court to strike Appellant
Korrin Peterson's Exhibit "D'\ the alleged transcript of the evidentiary hearing.
Appellant prepared this "transcript"—not by a licensed court reporter or someone
else licensed to prepare transcripts. Nor has Appellant filed a request for
transcripts in this case. Thus, Appellee Van Peterson asks this Court to Strike
Appellee's Exhibit "D."
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Conclusion
Since the Honorable Trial Judge shortened the notice requirement, and
since the hearing was not required anyway, the trial court did not commit manifest
error when the court denied Appellant Korrin Peterson's Rule 60 motion.
Therefore, Appellant Korrin Peterson's Motion for Summary Disposition should
be denied. In addition, since the question of whether the Trial Court made
sufficientfindings,Appellee Van Peterson asks this Court to defer ruling on that
portion of this Motion until the Record is assembled. Appellee Van Peterson also
asks this Court to strike Appellant's Exhibit "D," as it is not a proper transcript,
nor prepared by a person certified to prepare transcripts. Additionally, Appellee,
prays for his attorney's fees and costs in order to respond to Appellant's motion.

Douglas LrNeeley
s.
Attorney for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on this (/)
day of My, 2005,1 faxed and mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Opposition To Motion
For Summary Disposition, postage prepaid, to C. Val Morley, Attorney for Respondent, at
facsimile: (801)785-0853,110 South Main Street. Pleasant Grove, Utah, 84062.

